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IN THE
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OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
RONALD BRADSHAW,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
WALTER W. KERSHAW,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
HELEN G. KERSHAW,
Defendant,
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WILLARD B. ROGERS, EDWARD B.
R O G E R S and ROCKEFELLER
LAND & LIVESTOCK COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
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Case No.
13502

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT RONALD BRADSHAW
NATURE OF THE CASE
This action was brought in equity by Plaintiff-Respondent Ronald Bradshaw for the purpose of compelling
specific performance of an option agreement covering
real property and appurtenant water rights located in
Millard County, Utah.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial was commenced before a jury, but after
several days of trial and based upon the opening statements, proposed jury instructions submitted and argument of all counsel, the Court ruled that the case was
one involving specific performance and that the jury
should be dismissed. The Court thereupon proceeded to
hear and determine the matter sitting without the jury.
Upon conclusion of all evidence and based upon the submission of legal authorities, the Trial Court ordered that
the option agreement in question be specifically performed
by Appellant Walter W. Kershaw and doterniined that
the interest of Respondent Ronald Bradshaw in the subject property was superior to the interest claimed by
Appellant Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Ronald Bradshaw seeks affirmance of
the Judgment and Order entered by the Trial Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This action was initiated in January of 1971 by Respondent Ronald Bradshaw, hereinafter referred to as
"Bradshaw", against Appellant Walter W. Kershaw, hereinafter referred to as "Kershaw", seeking specific performance of an option agreement covering real property
and appurtenant water rights located in Millard County,
Utah. In the event that the option agreement could not
be performed, Bradshaw sought alternative relief in the
form of a money judgment.
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In October of 1971, a Second Amended Complaint
(R. 49) was filed in which Appellants Willard B. Rogers,
Edward B. Rogers and Rockefeller Land & Livestock Company (hereinafter Williard B. Rogers Mid Edward B.
Rogers will be collectively referred to as "Rogers" and
Rockefeller Land & Livestock Company will be referred
to as "Rockefeller") were joined as Defendants. The
Second Cause of Action of the Complaint alleged that
these parties had acquired an interest in the property
claimed by Bradshaw under the option agreement, but
that their interest was subject and inferior to the interest of Bradshaw.
A Counterclaim was filed by Kershaw against Bradshaw seeking damages for the alleged taking of certain
farm equipment. However, at the start of the trial, Kershaw moved to dismiss the Counterclaim (Tr. 8) and
this Motion was granted by the Court.
A Counterclaim (R. 65) was filed by Rockefeller
against Bradshaw asserting an affirmative, superior claim
to the property described in Bradshaw's Complaint. Rockefeller also filed a Cross-Claim (R. 68) against Kershaw
alleging that certain representations and warranties were
given by Kershaw in connection with a sale of the subject
property to Rockefeller and asking for judgment against
Kershaw in the event that the Court ultimately determined that Bradshaw was entitled to the property.
The trial commenced on October 31, 1972, and occupied four days. Following the conclusion of the trial, the
Court entered a Memorandum Decision (R. 136) in favor
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of Bradshaw and directed counsel to prepare and file proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment.
Such were filed and, after considering certain objections
with respect thereto, the Trial Court entered its Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Judgment and Order
(R. 231) directing Kershaw to specifically perform the
option agreement, holding that Bradshaw's interest in the
subject property was superior to that of Rockefeller, and
dismissing Rockefeller's Counterclaim and Cross-Claim.
Kershaw, Rogers and Rockefeller have all appealed the
decision of the Trial Court.
The property involved in this suit consists of 560
acres of real property and a 6 c.f.s. well permit. Mr. Kershaw, a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah, began acquiring
property in Millard County in 1969 (Tr. 141) with the
intention of putting together a large-scale famiing operation. The particular property involved in this suit was
acquired by Kershaw as follows:
1. Parcel No. 1, consisting of 480 acres of real property, was purchased from Marion Kesler in July
of 1969 (See Exhibit P-3 and Tr. 32-36, 143-149).
2. Parcel No. 2, consisting of 80 acres of real property, was being purchased by Kershaw from Grace
W. Staples (See Exhibit P-4 and Tr. 521).
3. The 6 c.f.s. well permit was acquired from Milo
and Boyd Watts (See Exhibit P-4 and Tr. 142,
143).
During the time that this property was being acquired
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by Kershaw, he was being assisted by Milton A. Christensen, whom he had authorized to act on his behalf.
By the middle of 1970, Mr. Kershaw had decided
that he did not want to follow through with Ins original
intention of establishing a farming operation in Millard
County and he approached Milton Christensen, who had
assisted him in acquiring the property, to see if Christensen would be able to raise some money and take over
Kershaw's interest in the various pieces of property in
Millard County (Tr. 151, 152, 534). As a result of this
discussion the option agreement (Exhibit P-4), which
the trial court ordered be specifically performed, was
signed.
The document, entitled "Option to Purchase Real
Property", is dated August 8, 1970. Kershaw testified
that he recalled having signed it on July 20 or 21, 1970
(Tr. 510) and Christensen, the other party to the agreement, could not recall the exact date on which it was
signed (Tr. 157). Whether the actual date of the execution of the document was July 20, 1970 or August 8,
1970, is immaterial, however, since the term of the option
was one year and the date on which the option was exercised was well within that one-year period, even assuming the July date.
The option agreement (Exhibit P-4) recites that
$100 was paid by the optionee (Christensen) to the optionor (Kershaw) and it further sets forth in paragraph
2 that the efforts of the optionee to obtain a loan from
the Farmers Home Administration would constitute a
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part of the consideration for the option. Such a loan
application was submitted to the Farmers Home Administration on July 20, 1970 but, after due consideration
within the agency, the application was rejected on September 15, 1970 (See Exhibit D-4).
Other essential terms of the option agreement are
as follows:
1. Term of option — one year (paragraph 8).
2. Property — a full legal description for 560 acres
of real property and a well permit is included
(paragraph 1).
3. Purchase price — $10,050.00 (paragraph 2).
4. Manner of exercise — a written notice of acceptance was required to be given by the optionee
to the optionor (paragraph 8).
5. Termination — irrevocable for four months; thereafter a written notice of termination could be
given (paragraph 8).
6. Manner of performance — described property
was to be conveyed by warranty deed, free and
clear of all encumbrances (paragraphs 1 and 6).
Following the date on which the option agreement
was executed, Mr. Christensen, the optionee, had possession of the property described in the agreement (Tr. 167).
He lived in Meadow, Utah, which is very close to where
the property is located (See Exhibit P-l), and he con-
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ducted a farming business on the property (Tr. 167,168),
part of which included entering into an agreement to feed
livestock thereon (Exhibit P-6 and Tr. 168-173) in November of 1970. In addition to the notice which was available through Christensen's active possession of the property, it is undisputed in the record that prior to the time
that it acquired any interest in the property, the agents
and employees of Rockefeller had been repeatedly advised of the existence of the option and of the fact that
Mr. Christensen claimed an interest in the property
covered thereby (Tr. 53-55,120-128,187-191, 369-371, 549,
550, 554, 555).
Under date of December 1, 1970, Mr. Christensen,
with the assistance of his attorney, Weston L. Bayles,
gave formal written notice (Exhibit P-7) to Kershaw
that he accepted the option. Kershaw acknowledged having received a copy of the notice of acceptance, with a
copy of the option agreement, by registered mail on December 2, 1970 (Tr. 512) and that about the same time
Mr. Christensen and Mr. Bayles personally visited him
and discussed the option with him.
Notwithstanding the receipt of the notice of acceptance on December 2,1970, fifteen days later, on December 17, 1970, Kershaw and his wife executed documents
(Exhibits D-7 and D-9) conveying a number of pieces
of property in Millard County to Rockefeller. The property conveyed by Kershaw to Rockefeller included Parcel
# 1 but not Parcel # 2 of the property covered by the
option agreement (Exhibit P-4). At the time that the
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conveyances from Kershaw to Rockefeller were executed
on December 17, 1970, Kershaw informed Rogers and
Rockefeller that he would hold their $5,000 check until
December 31, 1970, and that if, during that two week
period, they had any misgivings at all about the deal that
they had made he would return their check and rescind
the transaction (Tr. 552, 553).
On January 7, 1971, all of the right, title and interest of Milton W. Christensen and his wife, in and to the
option agreement and the property covered thereby were
assigned to Bradshaw (Exhibit P-5). On the following
day, January 8, 1971, Bradshaw, with the assistance of
his coimsel, formally advised Kershaw that a sum of
money had been deposited in escrow and that the balance
due under the option agreement would be paid to him
upon receipt, by the escrow agent, of a properly executed
warranty deed (See Exhibit E, attached to the Plaintiff's
Complaint at page 13 of the Record, and Exhibit P-9).
When Kershaw refused to deliver such a deed, this action
for specific performance was initiated.
A brief summary of the witnesses called and their
testimony is as follows:
I. Bradshaw9s witnesses:
A. Marion Leon Kesler — Testified that he had
acquired an interest in the 480 acres shown as Parcel # 1
on Exhibit P-4, together with additional property, from
Grant and Grace Staples in 1966 (Tr. 22) and that he
had conveyed the 480 acres to Kershaw in July of 1969
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(Tr. 34). He further testified that he was aware of the
option which had been given by Kershaw to Christensen
(Tr. 41) and that he personally discussed the option with
Willard B. Rogers in October of 1970 (Tr. 53, 54).
B. Jearald Gorden Rowen — Worked for Milton
Christensen on the 480 acres of property shown as Parcel
# 1 on Exhibit P-4 (Tr. 117) and in both August of 1970
(Tr. 121) and November of 1970 (Tr. 125), he heard
Christensen advise Willard B. Rogers of the fact that
he (Christensen) had an option on the property.
C. Milton Christensen — Testified that he worked
as a representative of Kershaw (Tr. 142) in acquiring
properties in Millard County, including the 480 acres
shown as Parcel # 1 on Exhibit P-4 (Tr. 144) and the 6
cf.s. well permit (Tr. 142). In 1970, Kershaw desired to
have Christensen take over the properties in which he
(Kershaw) had acquired an interest (Tr. 151). As a
result, Kershaw gave Christensen an option (Exhibit P-4)
covering 560 acres of property plus a well permit (Tr. 154).
An application for a loan, with the property covered by
the option to serve as collateral, was submitted to and
denied by the Farmers Home Administration in 1970 (Tr.
166). Thereafter, Christensen remained in possession of
the property (Tr. 167). Christensen testified that on
December 1, 1970 he gave written notice of his intention
to exercise the option to Kershaw (Tr. 173, 174). Christensen also testified that he personally advised Willard
B. Rogers of Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company
of the existence of the option and of his (Christensen's)
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claim to the property covered thereby in August of 1970
(Tr. 189) and in November of 1970 (Tr. 190). Finally,
Christensen testified that he assigned the option agreement to Bradshaw in January of 1971 (Tr. 192).
D. Grace W. Staples — Stated that she agreed with
Marion Kesler to release the 480 acres (Parcel # 1 on
Exhibit P-4) out of the escrow in which it was being held
(Tr. 325).
E. Respondent Ronald Bradshaw — Testified that
the option agreement was assigned to him in January
of 1971 (Tr. 335, 336) and that he immediately thereafter
tendered the balance of the purchase price due thereunder
to Kershaw (Tr. 381). Mr. Bradshaw also testified to
a conversation with WiUard B. Rogers in November of
1970 in which he (Bradshaw) specifically mentioned the
fact that Christensen had an option on the property (Tr.
370, 371).
F. Elizabeth Knkerton — Testified that Kershaw
acknowledged that an option in favor of Christensen had
been given in August of 1970 (Tr. 469-471).
G. Wilbur Harding — Called as an appraiser to
place a value on the property involved in the suit.
II. Kershaw's Witness:
The only witness called by Kershaw was Lee A.
Wankier, who testified that the loan application submitted by Milton Christensen to the Farmers Home Administration was denied on September 15, 1970 (Exhibit
D-4).
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III. Witness of Rogers and Rockefeller:
The only witness called by Rogers and Rockefeller
was Appellant Walter W. Kershaw. He testified that on
December 17, 1970, he and his wife conveyed property
to Rockefeller (Tr. 500, 501), and that prior to that date
he had advised Rogers and Rockefeller of the fact that
Christensen claimed an interest in the property pursuant
to an option agreement (Tr. 549, 550). With respect
to the option agreement (Exhibit P-4), Kershaw testified
that he signed the document on July 20 or 21, 1970, (Tr.
510) and that at the time that he signed it portions of the
agreement were in blank (Tr. 510-514).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE OPTION AGREEMENT IS A VALID
AND ENFORCEABLE LEGAL DOCUMENT
AND IT HAD NOT BEEN TERMINATED
AT THE TIME THAT IT WAS EXERCISED.
In order for specific performance of an agreement
to be required, the basic terms of the agreement must be
clear (Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P. 2d 491
(1967). A review of the option agreement (Exhibit P-4),
which the trial court ordered Kershaw to specifically perform, will show that the terms of the agreement are
clear and definite and that specific performance is an
appropriate remedy:
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1. Subject matter — The property covered by the
option is clearly and specifically described.
2. Parties — Milton A. Christensen and Walter W.
Kershaw are listed as the "buyer" and "seller",
respectively, and both signed the document.
3. Consideration — The agreement recites that
$100.00 consideration had been paid and Christensen testified (Tr. 164, 165) that such a payment was in fact made. The agreement also provides that the optionee's efforts to obtain a loan
would constitute a part of the consideration for
the option. There is no question that Christensen did make an effort to obtain such a loan (Exhibit D-4).
4. Manner of performance — Paragraph 8 provides
that the option can be exercised at any time while
it remains in force by mailing or delivering a
"written notice of acceptance" to the offeror. In
return for the payment of the balance owing under the agreement ($9,950.00), the optionor is
obligated to convey the described property by
general warranty deed (paragraph 6) "free and
clear of all encumbrances" (paragraph 1).
5. Duration of the contract — Paragraph 8 provides
that the offer will remain irrevocable for a period
of four months and that it will remain in force
therafter until one year from the date of the
agreement
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6. Manner of termination — The document, in paragraph 8, provides a specific procedure for termination after the four months' irrevocable period.
(Kershaw has never contended that he took the
steps outlined to terminate the offer — the most
that he has contended is that the rejection of
the loan application by the Farmers Home Administration "frustrated and terminated the entire
contract" (see page 10 of the original Kershaw
brief)).
With respect to the matter of termination, Kershaw
urges in Point I of his original brief that the option "had
no vitality after the loan application was rejected". He
cites a number of Utah cases which have held that in interpreting agreements the courts are obligated to carefully consider the specific language of the contract. He
then goes on, in what the Respondent believes is a rather
remarkable non sequitur, to do exactly what the authorities which he cites have said that you should not do, and
ignores the very specific language of the contract relating
to termination. In contending that the option agreement
automatically terminated when the loan application was
rejected, Kershaw is attempting to read something into
the agreement which simply is not there, in clear violation of the Parol Evidence Rule. Nowhere does the contract provide any such thing. What the agreement does
say is that the option will last for a period of one year
unless it is earlier terminated by the specific procedure
outlined.
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Respondent is in full agreement with the authorities
cited by Appellant Kershaw to the effect that the court
should "determine what the parties intended by what
they said". Nowhere in the written agreement in question here did the parties say that a rejection of the contemplated loan application would result in a termination
of the option. The agreement provides only two ways
for the option to be terminated:
1. By the passage of one year from the date of the
agreement, or
2. By the giving of a notice of termination in the
manner set forth in paragraph 8.
Inasmuch as neither one of these things had happened at the time of the exercise of the option, the conclusion is inescapable that the option agreement was in
force and that it was capable of being exercised at that
time.
In Point III of his original brief, Kershaw suggests
that what the trial court concluded was an enforceable
legal agreement actually contained fatal ambiguities.
Kershaw does not contend (and the evidence did not
show) that he had no interest in the real property and
the well permit covered by the option agreement. On
the contrary, the evidence clearly showed that he had an
interest in each piece of property. His interest in Parcel
No. 1 was obtain from Marion L. Kesler (Exhibit P-3);
his interest in the 6 c.f.s. well permit was obtained from
Milo and Boyd Watts (as Exhibit P-4 recites); and his
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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interest in Parcel No. 2 was being purchased under a contract between Grace W. Staples and Walter W. Kershaw
(as Exhibit P-4 recites).
The fact that the agreement allocates the total purchase price for the property ($10,050.00) between the two
parcels — $7,200.00 for Parcel No. 1 and $2,850.00 for
Parcel No. 2 — is certainly not a source of ambiguity.
Neither is it a problem that Kershaw's interest was
derived from separate agreements on which there were
payables at the time that the option agreement was entered into. In Point III of his original brief, Kershaw
asserts that his right to obtain Parcel No. 1 was dependant on the payment of certain money in connection with
the "Staples escrow" and that Bradshaw was aware of
this. He then goes on to cite cases dealing with a "mutual
mistake of fact". In the first place, if everyone involved
in the situation was fully aware of the status of the property, there is clearly no mutual mistake of fact. In the
second place, it is a very common practice for people to
agree to convey title to property which they have only
a contractual right to acquire or to agree to convey marketable title to property on which there are, at the time
of the agreement, liens and encumbrances. That this is
a legitimate procedure is evident from the following:
"It is not unusual for persons to agree to convey by a certain time, notwithstanding they have
no title to the land at the time of the contract,
and the validity of such agreements is upheld.
In such cases, the vendor assumes the risk of
acquiring the title and making the conveyance,
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or responding in damages for the vendee's loss
of his bargain. One having an option to purchase
real estate has a legal right to enter into an executory contract to sell the property. A fortiori,
it is not necessary that the vendor be the absolute owner of the property at the time he enters
into the agreement of sale. An equitable estate
in land, or a right to become the owner of the
land, is as much the subject of sale as is the land
itself, and whenever one is so situated with reference to a tract of land that he can acquire the
title thereto, either by the voluntary act of the
parties holding the title, or by proceedings at
law or in equity, he is in a position to make a
valid agreement for the sale thereof . . ." 55
Am. Jur., "Vendor and Purchaser", § 12.
At the time that the option agreement was entered into,
Kershaw either owned or had a clear legal right to acquire
everything that he agreed to sell. Upon the exercise of
the option, he was (and is) in a position to perform by
acquiring the title to the real property covered by the
option from Staples pursuant to his contractual right to
do so.
Answering Point IV of the brief of Rogers and Rockefeller, the option agreement (Exhibit P-4) clearly shows
what the parties thereto intended. All of the terms of
the contract are clear and definite and the required mutuality is present. The trial court was correct in ordering
that it be specifically performed.
POINT II.
THE EXERCISE OF THE OPTION AND
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THE TENDER OF PERFORMANCE BY RESPONDENT WERE PROPER AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE
AGREEMENT.
In Corbin on Contracts, (One Volume Edition, 1952),
at § 264, the author reviews the legal transformation that
takes place in connection with the acceptance of an option
as follows:
1. A person who holds an option which was given
for a consideration holds a "power of acceptance".
The optionor is subject to a binding contract, but
his duty to convey is conditional upon receiving
notice of acceptance in the manner provided in
the option agreement.
2. The giving of a notice of acceptance by the offeree amounts to the performance of a condition
precedent to the offeror's duty of immediate performance. The giving of the notice does not
make a new contract — it merely advances an
existing contractual obligation one step further
along its way, turning the duty of the offeror
that was conditional on notice into a duty that
is no longer so conditional.
3. Nevertheless, even after the notice of acceptance
is given, the offeror's duty to convey is still conditional upon the tender of the purchase price
within a reasonable time. As soon as such a tender is made, the offeror has an immediate, enDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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forceable obligation to convey the property covered by the option.
As indicated above, the record is clear that the option
agreement (Exhibit P-4), which the trial court ordered
Kershaw to perform, was supported by consideration and
that it had not terminated, either by the passage of time
or by the giving of the required termination notice, at
the time of the acceptance and tender in December of
1970 and January of 1971.
A brief review of the steps taken in connection with
the acceptance and tender might be helpful in demonstrating that the Respondent met his burden of proving
that he "exercised the option in accordance with its
terms." Lincoln Land and Development Co. v. Thompson,
26 Utah 2d 324, 489 P. 2d 426 (1971).
1. On December 1, 1970, a notice (Exhibit P-7)
signed by Milton Christensen (the optionee) and
by his attorney was mailed to Kershaw (the optionor) notifying him that Christensen "accepts
the option granted him August 8, 1970." The
notice of acceptance contains a description of the
property and it refers to the agreed purchase
price. Kershaw acknowledged at the trial that
he received a copy of Exhibit P-7 by registered
mail on December 2, 1970 (Tr. 512). The giving
of the notice of acceptance in this manner conformed exactly with the procedure outlined by
paragraph 8 of the option agreement.
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2. Following the assignment of Christensen's rights
under the option agreement to Respondent Ronald Bradshaw on January 7, 1971 (Exhibit P-5),
Bradshaw immediately proceeded to tender the
balance of the purchase price which was due under the agreement ($10,050 price, less $100 down
payment = $9,950 balance due). This was done
by mailing a letter to Kershaw (Exhibit E, attached to the plaintiff's complaint, found at page
13 of the Record — in his answer Kershaw acknowledged that this notice was, in fact, given
and thus no evidence relating thereto was presented at the time of the trial — see also Tr. 382
relating to the tender offer) in which Bradshaw,
through his counsel, specifically tendered to Kershaw the balance owing under the option agreement — $9,950. With the letter was a copy of
an escrow instructions letter (Exhibit P-9) addressed to Security Title Company of Salt Lake
City and a blank warranty deed for execution
by Kershaw and his wife.
3. The escrow agent, Security Title Company, was
instructed to hold the money which was deposited
and to pay $9,950 over to Kershaw upon receiving a warranty deed signed by Kershaw and his
wife conveying the property described in the option agreement.
Utah has a statute (Utah Code Annotated § 7827-1 (1953)) which provides as follows:
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"An offer in writing to pay a particular sum
of money or to deliver a written instrument or
specific personal property, is, if not accepted,
equivalent to the actual production and tender
of the money, instrument or property."
The Trial Court specifically found, in paragraph 8 of its
Findings of Fact, that the Respondent's tender offer to
pay the balance owing under the option agreement was
proper and sufficient under the statute referred to above.
Appellant Kershaw has raised two questions with
reference to the tender of performance of the Respondent:
1. The first contention is that in requiring that Kershaw's wife execute the warranty deed, the Respondent asked for something more than was
provided for in the option agreement (Point IV
of Kershaw's original brief), and
2. The second point is that in instructing the escrow
agent to show "Grace Staples, individually and
as Guardian of the Estate of Grant D. Staples"
as a payee on the check which was to be delivered
to Kershaw, the Respondent thereby recognized
certain "uncertainties and ambiguities of the option agreement" (Point II of Appellant Kershaw's
second brief).
With respect to the first alleged defect in Bradshaw's
tender, it is true that the blank deed which was delivered
to Kershaw in connection with Bradshaw's tender called
for the signature of his wife. The deed was prepared in
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this manner because the option agreement obKgates the
optionor to convey title "free and clear of all encumbrances" (paragraph 1) and it further requires the conveyance of "a valid, unencumbered, indefeasible fee-simple
title to said property" (paragraph 6). A married grantor
simply cannot convey such title unless his wife joins in
the conveyance or unless other steps are taken to eliminate her statutory inchoate interest in the property (Utah
Code Annotated, § 74-4-3 (1953), as indicated by the
following:
"The purchaser in a contract for the sale of
land, entitled to a conveyance of a marketable
title, free and clear of encumbrances, is entitled
to a conveyance free and clear of any outstanding
right of dower or courtesy, or of any statutory
right or interest of a spouse of the vendor or of
any grantor in his claim of title. While it is not
essential to the validity of a contract for the sale
of land that the spouse of the vendor join in the
execution of the contract in the absence of any
statutory requirement of such joinder, it is essential, in order to convey a marketable title, that
a spouse who has a dower or courtesy interest
in the title join in the execution of the vendor's
deed. Title to land is not "marketable" in the
sense of that term as used with reference to the
obligation of the vendor to convey a marketable
title when there is in the chain of title a deed not
joined in by the spouse of the grantor, living at
the time of the execution of the deed, unless it
is made to appear that such defect is cured
by the lapse of time, or in some other
way. // the vendor has a wife living at the time
of the performance of his contract to convey and
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she has not released her inchoate dower interest
or statutory rights in lieu thereof\ her joinder in
the execution of the deed is essential in order
to enable the vendor to convey a marketable
title. He alone cannot convey a marketable title
since in such case there would be the outstanding
dower or statutory interest in the wife." (Emphasis added.) 55 Am. Jur. "Vendor and Purchaser" § 243.
Thus, in order for there not to be an immediate breach
of paragraphs 1 and 6 of the agreement and of the statutory covenants set forth in Utah Code Annotated, § 571-12 (1953), it was essential that Kershaw's wife join in
the conveyance to Bradshaw. The proposed warranty
deed which was forwarded to Kershaw (Exhibit P-9) did
call for the signature of Dorothy Kershaw, as the wife
of Walter W. Kershaw. If, as the record reflects (Tr. 500
and Exhibit D-7 and D-9), Kershaw was at this time
married to Helen Kershaw rather than Dorothy Kershaw,
it would have been a very simple matter for him to have
either substituted Helen's name for the name of Dorothy
or to have arranged for a new deed to be prepared containing the name of Helen Kershaw.
It is also interesting to note that the conveyances
(Exhibits D-7 and D-9), which were executed by Kershaw in favor of Rockefeller on December 17, 1970 (15
days after Kershaw acknowledged having received the
notice of acceptance of the option from Milton Christensen) were executed by his wife, Helen Kershaw. For
Kershaw to complain about having been asked to obtain
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the signature of his wife on a warranty deed at a time
very close to the time when she joined him in executing
several conveyances in favor of other persons is a very
questionable maneuver and Bradshaw believes that it
illustrates that the Appellants have attempted to grasp
any straw, no matter how insubstantial, in opposing
Bradshaw's right to the relief to which he is clearly entitled.
Kershaw has also expressed concern about the fact
that the escrow agent, in the Escrow Instructions Letter
(Exhibit P-9), was asked to show Mrs. Grace Staples,
individually and as guardian of the estate of her husband,
as a payee on the check to be delivered to Kershaw. The
record clearly shows that in order for Kershaw to be able
to convey marketable title to the property, as he obligated
himself in the option agreement (Exhibit P-4) to do, he
had to (1) get the 480 acre piece (Parcel No. 1) extracted from an escrow agreement, in which the property
was being held for the benefit of Mr. and Mrs. Staples,
the "Sellers" (See Exhibits P-2 and P-3) and (2) in
order for him to be able to convey the 80 acre piece (Parcel No. 2), he had to pay off a separate contract which
he had with Mr. and Mrs. Staples (See paragraph 1 of
Exhibit P-4 and Tr. 151, 152). The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that it is an extremely common
practice in real estate transactions for the buyer to include as payees on his check which is delivered to the
seller the names of persons who have an interest in the
property which must be cleared in order for the seller to
be able to convey marketable title. This protects the
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buyer and generally isn't a problem to the seller since
he must "make his peace" with the persons claiming the
interest anyway.
In asking for the signature of Mrs. Kershaw on the
deed and in instructing the escrow agent to include Mrs.
Staples as a payee on the check to be delivered to Mr.
Kershaw, Bradshaw was merely taking well accepted and
prudent steps to protect himself. These things did not
place an additional burden on Kershaw and they did not
affect in any way the legality of Bradshaw's acceptance
and tender under the option agreement.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN DISCHARGING T H E
JURY AND PROCEEDING TO HEAR AND
DECIDE THE CASE.
In the Judgment which was entered by the trial
court on August 28, 1973 (R. 231), the court's reasons
for discharging the jury midway through the trial were
set forth in some detail as follows:
1. The plaintiff's primary claim for relief was specific performance (an alternative claim for damages had been abandoned).
2. The counterclaim of Kershaw for damages had
been dismissed on Kershaw's own motion.
3. The opening statements of counsel for Kershaw
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and Rogers, as well as that of Bradshaw, all
pointed to specific performance as the essential
issue in dispute.
4. The proposed jury instructions of all parties were
addressed to specific performance.
In Point III of the Rogers brief, four separate issues
are listed which they contend entitled them to a jury
trial. An examination of the Usted issues in the context
of the lawsuit will disclose that all four of them relate
only to whether Bradshaw was entitled to have the option
agreement (Exhibit P-4) specifically performed.
The rule is not uncertain in this jurisdiction that
an action for specific performance is purely equitable
(Cook v. Gardner, 14 Utah 2d 193, 381 P. 2d 78 (1963),
and that,
"If the question respecting title is equitable,
no party is, as a matter of right, entitled to a
jury trial . . .". Ketchum Coal Co. v. District
Court, 48 Utah 342, 159 Pac. 737 (1916).
Such precedent of this Court is in harmony with the
law throughout the Country, as indicated by the following:
"The remedy of speicfic performance of contracts
is purely equitable; courts of law have no power
to compel specific performance of any kind of
contract". 49 Am. Jur., "Specific Performance",
§2.
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"The right to trial by jury does not extend to
cases of equity jurisdiction, and if it is conceded
or clearly shown that a case belongs to this class,
the trial of the questions involved in it belongs
to the court itself, no matter what may be its importance or complexity. Equitable actions as
such are not within the constitutional provisions
that the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate . . .". 47 Am. Jur., 2d, "Jury", § 32.
While it is submitted that no reasonable doubt existed as to the essential nature of the case as being
one of specific performance, it is appropriate to note that
where there is any doubt as to whether the case is one
in equity or one in law, the trial court is vested with
sound discretion in determining whether the trial should
be to the court or to a jury. In the case of Sweeney v.
Happy Valley, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 113, 417 P. 2d 126 (1966),
the Court held as follows:
"In circumstances where doubt exists as to
whether the cause should be regarded as one in
equity, or one in law wherein the party can insist on a jury as a matter of right, the trial
court should have some latitude of discretion.
In making that determination it is not bound by
the ostensible form of the action, nor by the particular wording of the pleadings. It may examine
into the nature of the rights asserted and the
remedies sought in the light of the facts of the
case to ascertain which predominates; and from
that determination make the appropriate order
as to a jury or non-jury trial . . . it is the prerogative of the judge who actually tries the case
to make the determination. Unless it is shown
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that the ruling was patently in error or an abuse
of discretion, this court will not interfere with
the ruling thereon" (Emphasis added.)
In the very recent case of Corbet v. Cox, 30 Utah 2d 361,
517 P. 2d 1318 (1974), this Court reaffirmed the discretion vested in the trial court and in so doing cited with
approval the language set forth above from Sweeney.
A brief discussion of Rockefeller's claim for quiet
title will help to demonstrate that no legal issue was
raised by the evidence which entitled it to a jury trial
as a matter of right. The document under which Bradshaw's interest is vested in the subject property (Exhibit
P-4), is dated August 8, 1970; the document under which
Rockefeller asserts an interest in said property (Exhibit
D-9) is dated December 17, 1970. Since Rockefeller's
interest in the property came into being more than four
months after the interest under which Bradshaw claims
came into being, in order for Rockefeller to prevail, it
had to establish that it was a bona fide purchaser for
value, having no notice of the option and the claim of
the optionee thereunder. The evidence was totally inconsistent with this position. Virtually all of the witnesses
testified that Rockefeller and its agents had knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of the option and the claim
of Milton Christensen thereunder at the time that Rockefeller acquired its interest in the property. These witnesses included:
Marion Leon Kesler — Tr. 53-55
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Jearald Gordon Rowan — Tr. 120-128
Milton Christensen — Tr. 167,168,187-191
Ronald Bradshaw — Tr. 369-371
Walter W. Kershaw — Tr. 549, 550, 554, 555
In the face of this profusion of evidence that Rockefeller had full knowledge of the option and the claim of
Milton Christensen, Bradshaw's assignor, at the time it
acquired its interest in the property in question, Rogers
and Rockefeller chose to simply rest their case. The
Rogers did not take the stand personally to deny having
had such knowledge and they did not call any other
witnesses to help support their claim that Rockefeller was
a bona fide purchaser for value. Thus, the evidence presented by the Respondent on this issue remained completely unchallenged. Under these circumstances, even
if the jury had not been discharged, the Court would have
had no choice but to direct a verdict on this issue, since
the testimony did not give rise to any factual dispute on
the point.
In short, the jury was properly discharged since the
basic nature of the case was equitable and involved a claim
for specific performance. The correctness of excusing the
jury was clearly shown when the quiet title aspect of
the case was not even put in issue as a result of the Rogers'
failure to present any evidence in support of their position.
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POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY AWARDED
ATTORNEY'S FEES TO THE RESPONDENT.
The trial court awarded Bradshaw, pursuant to a
provision in paragraph 4 of Exhibit P-4, $2,000 in attorney's fees. The language in question obligates the Seller
(optionor) to pay "all expenses of title clearance . . .
including . . . attorney's fees." Respondent submits that
this contractual agreement is sufficient under the established rule that such fees can be awarded only where
they are authorized by express agreement or statute.
{Humphries v. Remco, Inc., 30 Utah 2d 348, 517 P. 2d
1309 (1974)).
Appellant Kershaw argues that this provision was
included only for the benefit of the government. However, the government is not even a party to the agreement.
It is a two-party contract between Bradshaw's assignor
and Appellant Kershaw. While the document contemplates an application to the Farmers Home Administration, as has already been discussed there is nothing in
the contract which limits its vitality to a situation where
such a loan application is accepted.
A brief consideration of the facts of this case will
clearly show that Kershaw, by his own acts, created title
problems which had to be cleared through an action such
as that herein and that it is accordingly appropriate that
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attorney's fees be awarded, in accordance with the precise
terms of Kershaw's written agreement.
On December 2, 1970, Kershaw received formal,
written notice (Exhibit P-7) that the option agreement
(Exhibit P-4) had been accepted. This notice fulfilled
the specific requirement of the agreement (a copy of
which was delivered therewith — Tr. 512) as to the
manner in which it was to be exercised and clearly notified Kershaw of the fact that Christensen claimed an
interest in the property which is described in both the
agreement and the notice. Notwithstanding this notification to Kershaw of Christansen's claim, Kershaw proceeded to convey part of the exact same property to
Rockefeller on December 17, 1970 (Exhibits D-7 and
D-9), only fifteen days later, thus creating a title
problem which could only be eliminated by litigation.
By his own conscious act, Kershaw placed himself
in a position where he was not able to convey an unencumbered fee simple title to the property, as he had agreed
to do. Under these circumstances, it was clearly warranted for the trial court to award attorney's fees based
on the specific agreement to pay such.
POINT V.
THE INTEREST WHICH BRADSHAW ACQUIRED AROSE PRIOR TO THE TIME
THAT APPELLANT ROCKEFELLER ACQUIRED ITS INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY AND ROCKEFELLER WAS
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NOT A GOOD FAITH PURCHASER ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE RECORDING ACT.
In Point II of its Brief, Rockefeller contends that the
recording statutes require a finding that its interest in
the property is superior to that of the Respondent. A
brief chronology of events might be helpful in considering
this contention:
July 20 or 21, 1970 — Date on which Kershaw testified he signed the option agreement (Exhibit
P-4) covering the subject property (Tr. 510).
August 8,1970 — Date of option agreement (Exhibit
P-4).
December 1, 1970 — Date of notice (Exhibit P-7)
given by Christensen to Kershaw accepting the
option.
December 2, 1970 — Date on which Kershaw acknowledged receiving the notice of acceptance of
the option (Tr. 512).
December 17, 1970 — Date of documents executed
by Walter W. Kershaw and Helen G. Kershaw
assigning interest in real and personal property
to Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company
(Exhibits D-7 and D-9).
December 22,1970 — Kershaw to Rockefeller conveyances (Exhibits D-7 and D-9) recorded in the
office of the Millard County Recorder.
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December 23, 1970 — Kershaw to Christensen option
(Exhibit P-4) recorded in the office of the Millard County Recorder.
January 7, 1971 — Date of assignment of rights (Exhibit P-5) under the Kershaw-Christensen option (Exhibit P-4) to Ronald Bradshaw.
As the above chronology wiU help to illustrate, the
option agreement (Exhibit P-4) under which Bradshaw
claims, was executed more than four months prior to the
time when Rockefeller acquired its interest in the subject
property. The notice of acceptance of the option was
also given by Christensen and received by Kershaw fifteen days prior to the date of the conveyance to Rockefeller. Under these circumstances, the after-acquired interest of Rockefeller is clearly subject to the interest created by the option agreement unless Rockefeller can
qualify under the requirements of the Recording Act
(Utah Code Annotated, § 57-3-3 (1953)), which provides
as follows:
"Every conveyance of real estate hereafter made,
which shall not be recorded as provided in this
title, shall be void as against any subsequent
purchaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration of the same real estate, or any portion
thereof, where his own conveyance shall be first
duly recorded."
Under the statute, the only way that Rockefeller's
after-acquired interest in the property could have been
held to have taken precedence over Bradshaw's interest
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under the option agreement was if Rockefeller's evidence
established that,
1. Rockefeller acquired its interest for a valuable
consideration;
2. At a time when it had no actual or constructive
notice of the interest created by the option agreement; and
3. That it was the first to place its interest of record.
As indicated above, Rockefeller's conveyance was recorded one day prior to the date on which the option
agreement was recorded. In addition, the Rockefeller
conveyances reflect that they were executed for valuable
consideration and there is nothing in the record to suggest
that this is untrue. Thus, the critical consideration is the
notice or lack of notice that Rockefeller had at the time
that it acquired its interest in the disputed property.
An examination of this record will disclose that Rockefeller totally failed to meet its burden of proving that
it purchased in "good faith". As the Respondent has
elsewhere recounted, the evidence presented during the
trial overwhelmingly established that the agents and employees of Rockefeller had both actual and constructive
notice of the existence of the option and the claim of
Christensen thereunder at the time that Rockefeller acquired its interest. In the face of this evidence, Rockefeller simply rested its case, calling no witnesses at all
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chaser. The one witness that Rockefeller did call, Appellant Kershaw, testified clearly that he personally advised
the agents of Rockefeller, prior to the date of the conveyance to it, of the fact that Christensen did claim an
interest in the subject property pursuant to an option
agreement (Tr. 549, 550, 554, 555).
The claim of Respondent Bradshaw to the property
in question is based upon an instrument (the option
agreement) which was executed and accepted prior to
the date of the conveyance to Rockefeller. Inasmuch as
the agents of Rockefeller had abundant actual and constructive notice of the existence of the option agreement
and the resulting adverse interest in the property described therein at the time that the subject property was
conveyed to Rockefeller, its interest was acquired subject
to the prior interest created by the option. The claim
of Rockefeller that it has a prior interest is clearly unsupported by the facts of the case and the law pertaining
thereto.
POINT VI.
CHRISTENSEN DID NOT VIOLATE ANY
DUTY IN HIS DEALINGS WITH KERSHAW.
In Point I of their Brief, Rogers and Rockefeller
suggest that Christensen (Respondent's assignor) may
have violated a duty owed to Kershaw and that this
should somehow affect Respondent's claim to the property.
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A review of the record in the case will disclose that
Kershaw originally acquired an interest in the property
which is the subject of this action with the intention of
putting together a large-scale farming operation in Millard County. During the time that the properties were
being acquired, Christensen acted as his agent. However,
at the time that the option agreement (Exhibit P-4) was
executed, in the summer of 1970, Kershaw had decided
that he did not want to proceed with the proposed farming operation and he was anxious to have Mr. Christensen take over his interest in the various pieces of property in Millard County. At that point, Christensen's
status as an agent (which had been limited in scope to
the acquisition of properties) had terminated and he was
at liberty to deal with Mr. Kershaw as any other prospective purchaser might. (See 3 Am. Jur., 2d, "Agency",
§ 230.)
The written contract which was entered into (Exhibit P-4) was in the interest of both Christensen and
Kershaw. Kershaw testified specifically that he was willing to give Christensen an option on all of his properties
in Millard County (Tr. 531, 532), and that at the time
bhait the option agreement was signed, Christensen was
'working as a compatriot" and Kershaw hoped that he
would be able to acquire all of the properties (Tr. 534).
While Kershaw made certain assumptions relating
to the effect on the option agreement of the denial of
Christensen's loan application by the Farmers Home Adninistration which were inconsistent with Christensen's
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view (and with the specific terms of the instrument), the
fact remains that at the time that the option agreement
was executed it was the clear intention of both Christensen and Kershaw that an option be given.
At the time that the option agreement was signed,
the previously existing but limited agency relationship
between Kershaw and Christensen had terminated. The
two dealt with each other at arms length in an ordinary
business transaction; there was no essential disagreement
regarding what Kershaw was giving and Christensen was
getting. While there was no specific duty on the part of
Christensen to disclose any particular information to
Kershaw, Kershaw was nevertheless made aware of the
denial of the application by the Farmers Home Administration and of the fact that Christensen accepted the option on December 1, 1970, fifteen days before Kershaw
attempted to convey the property to Rockefeller.
Appellants Rockefeller and Rogers have cited the
case of Holland v. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P. 2d 989
(1960), in support of their contention that Christensen
violated some fiduciary duty to Kershaw. As the Court
will recall, the Holland case involved a claim by the Holland family against their attorney and his transferees
for conduct on the part of the attorney in connection with
the sale of certain mining claims in which the attorney
had acquired an interest. This Court held that the attorney's conduct in arranging to sell the client's three-fourths
interest in the claims for $100,000 and his own one-fourth
interest in the claims to the same purchaser for $287,000,
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coupled with his concealment of the pertinent facts, constituted fraud and a violation of his fiduciary duty.
In the instant case, as has already been indicated, no
agency relationship existed at the time of the agreement
between Kershaw and Christensen. In addition, both
parties to the option agreement fully understood what
was being done — there was no concealment and relevant
facts were fully disclosed. Thus, the Holland case is clearly
distinguishable and it has no application at all to the
present controversy.
POINT VII.
THE COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE
CLAIM OF APPELLANT ROCKEFELLER
LAND AND LIVESTOCK C O M P A N Y
AGAINST APPELLANT KERSHAW.
The Cross-Claim (R. 68) of Appellant Rockefeller
against Appellant Kershaw alleges that Kershaw represented and warranted certain things to Rockefeller in
connection with the transaction which took place on December 17, 1970, and that if the Court determined that
the Plaintiff (Respondent herein) was entitled to the
property, Rockefeller should be awarded a judgment
over against Kershaw.
Respondent has no actual stake in the outcome of
this issue, since it involves a dispute which is limited to
the appellants. However, Respondent does have an in-
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terest in getting this case resolved, once and for all, and
avoiding further hearings and a prolongation of the matter. Thus, a few comments regarding the Cross-Claim
are offered.
Following the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, Rockefeller called only one witness, Walter W. Kershaw, pursuant to Rule 43 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Neither Edward nor Willard Rogers testified and no agent
or employee of Rockefeller Land and Livestock Company
was called to the stand. Rockefeller apparently believed
that the documentary evidence which was introduced,
together with the testimony of Kershaw and the value
testimony of Bradshaw's witness, Wilbur R. Harding, were
sufficient to establish their right to a judgment over
against Kershaw.
Respondent believes that a few questions will help
to illustrate that Rockefeller simply did not meet its
burden of proof with respect to its Cross-Claim against
Kershaw:
1. Where is the warranty that Rockefeller claims
was breached? Exhibit D-9 is only a Quit-Claim
Deed and the warranty language in the second
paragraph of Exhibit D-7 only guarantees that
the assignee will take over the position of buyer
under the Staples Escrow.
2. Was the evidence sufficient to establish the
amount of Rockefeller's damages? One claiming
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that he is entitled to recover damages has the
burden of proving the amount of his damages. The
Assignment form (Exhibit D-7) which was executed by Kershaw simply substituted Rockefeller
as the "Buyer" under the Staples Escrow, with
an obligation to pay off the balance owing in
order to get title to the property being held in
escrow. No evidence was introduced concerning
the amount owing on the Staples Escrow. The
only way that the trial court could have calculated
Rockefeller's damages would have been to have
subtracted the amount owing on the Staples Escrow from the value of the property — this was
impossible since no evidence was introduced with
respect to the balance owing on the Staples Escrow. In addition, the conveyances from Kershaw
to Rockefeller (Exhibits D-7 and D-9) describe
property other than the 480 acres claimed by
Bradshaw. No evidence was introduced regarding this property, its status or the value thereof.
Here again, this obsence of proof gave the trial
court no way to calculate Rockefeller's alleged
damages.
These unanswered questions are only intended to be
llustrative of the fact that the record was not sufficient
t the time that Appellant Rockefeller rested to justify
he trial court in awarding it a judgment over against
Appellant Kershaw. In view of this failure of proof, the
[ismissal of the Cross-Claim of Rockefeller was correct.
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CONCLUSION
This case was presented to the Trial Court over a
period of four full days. The parties had a full and an
adequate opportunity to present evidence and legal authorities to the Trial Court supporting their positions
with respect to the issues. In view of the extensive evi
dence presented by Bradshaw and the rather remarkable
failure on the part of the other parties to introduce testimonial or documentary evidence, the Trial Court properly
granted Bradshaw the relief that he had requested. The
decision of the Trial Court was supported by clear and
convincing evidence and the Judgment and Order should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL
PHILIP C. PUGSLEY
Attorneys for Respondent
Ronald Bradshaw
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